1726, ISBN: 625fcf28a65b2d836068d2a3a560a1e9

Gebraucht, guter Zustand, [PU: J. Darby, A. Bettesworth, F. Fayram, J. Pemberton, C. Rivington, J. Hooke, F. Clay, J. Batley, E. Symon], PHILOSOPHY MORAL PHILOSOPHICAL MORALITY ETHICS, Se… Mehr…

Gebraucht, guter Zustand, [PU: J. Darby, A. Bettesworth, F. Fayram, J. Pemberton, C. Rivington, J. Hooke, F. Clay, J. Batley, E. Symon], PHILOSOPHY MORAL PHILOSOPHICAL MORALITY ETHICS, Second edition, corrected and enlarged. Front joint weakening, a few abrasions on boards, lacks spine label, page base margin lightly stained (larger stains on first section of pages that touch but do not obscure text), ink name and date on front endpaper (George Dobler, Lancaster, 1814), ink gift note preceding text of first treatise ('Bestowed by Nathan Tarbell to Samuel Tarbell April 1st, 1771'). 1726 Full-Leather. 304 pp. 4to. Hutcheson's works influenced those of David Hume and Adam Smith. Gladys Bryson in Man and Society (1945) was probably the first modern scholar to contend that Francis Hutcheson was the 'father' of the Scottish Enlightenment, a view confirmed by Charles Camic in Experience and Enlightenment (1983): "His celebrated proclamations on economics, politics, psychology, and ethics challenged a solid phalanx of received wisdoms and anticipated many of the specific arguments. of Hume and Smith." Hutcheson's "first philosophical work [was] An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725). In the first of the two treatises contained in the Inquiry he argued that there is an internal sense, analogous to the five external senses, which brings to mind ideas of beauty, order, harmony, and design, whenever one perceives objects, artefacts, scenes, and compositions which exhibit uniformity amid variety. In the second treatise he argued for the presence in human nature of a moral sense which determines one to recognize virtue whenever one observes a character or an action prompted by benevolence or kind affection. He found no merit in arguments which reduce virtue to self-interest, however useful or serviceable to others such interested conduct might appear. 'If there be any Benevolence at all, it must be disinterested; for the most useful Action imaginable, loses all appearance of Benevolence, as soon as we discern that it only flowed from Self-Love, or Interest' (p. 129). His argument that the moral sense forms a natural or instinctive part of human nature was directed pointedly against the contention of Bernard Mandeville that virtue and vice are artificial distinctions, the inventions of politicians, who employ these terms for no other reason than to curb the appetites and ambitions of unruly subjects. Hutcheson's Inquiry provoked an extended, mutually respectful exchange with the Revd Gilbert Burnet (1690?1726) in the London Journal (April?December, 1725). Burnet (using the pseudonym Philaretus) argued that Hutcheson's determination to ground moral distinctions upon sensibility and feeling left moral life without an adequate foundation. He proposed that antecedently to any sensation or feeling of virtue there must be a reason or a rational apprehension of goodness and rectitude. Hutcheson (writing as Philanthropus) countered that in order for the terms reason, reasonable, and rational to be meaningful they must refer to the happiness of persons or moral agents; an individual who prefers his own happiness to the general or public happiness might be considered reasonable but he could not be considered moral; one who prefers the greater or public happiness to his own happiness is properly considered not only reasonable but also moral or virtuous. The latter judgement cannot be based upon reason: it must derive from a still more basic feeling that benevolent or public-spirited action is singularly or particularly virtuous." (Oxford Dictionary of National Biography) Hutcheson later expounded upon his philosophical system in the posthumously published 1755 work A System of Moral Philosophy.<

1981, ISBN: 625fcf28a65b2d836068d2a3a560a1e9

Gebundene Ausgabe

London: Printed for J. Darby, A. Bettesworth et al., 1726. Second edition revised and expanded. Hardcover. poor to g+. Octavo. xxvi, (1) 304pp. Original blind-stamped decorative calf wi… Mehr…

London: Printed for J. Darby, A. Bettesworth et al., 1726. Second edition revised and expanded. Hardcover. poor to g+. Octavo. xxvi, (1) 304pp. Original blind-stamped decorative calf with gilt lettering on spine. Raised bands. Though the name of the author does not appear in the title, a dedication to John Lord Cateret is signed Francis Hutcheson. Regarded as one of the earliest modern writers on aesthetics Hutcheson and was appointed Chair of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow, succeeding his master Gershom Carmichael in 1729. Hutcheson's philosophical system is founded on the observation of human nature, and in these works he elaborates on the correlation between beauty and goodness, harmony and pleasure, respectively the moral good and evil, virtue and vice. Hutcheson was an important influence on David Hume and Adam Smith and the American historian Norman Fiering names Hutcheson as one of the "most influential and respected moral philosophers in America of the eighteenth century (Moral Philosophy at Seventeenth-Century Harvard: A Discipline in Transition, 1981, p. 199)." Inside cover contains bookplate of Samuel Bosanquet Esq. (1700-1765); his son, also named Samuel, was Governor of the bank of England from 1791-1793. Sam Bosanquet 1729 inked to top of title page. Front cover separated but present; back cover attached but cracked at joint. Binding with wear along edges and rubbed. Block with sporadic foxing throughout. Binding in overall poor, interior in good+ condition., Printed for J. Darby, A. Bettesworth et al., 1726, 1<