ISBN: 1230227040

[EAN: 9781230227047], Neubuch, [PU: TheClassics.us], SIR CHARLES WILLIAM PASLEY,CHARLES PASLEY,SUBJECTS, This item is printed on demand. Paperback. 130 pages. Dimensions: 9.7in. x 7.4in. … Mehr…

[EAN: 9781230227047], Neubuch, [PU: TheClassics.us], SIR CHARLES WILLIAM PASLEY,CHARLES PASLEY,SUBJECTS, This item is printed on demand. Paperback. 130 pages. Dimensions: 9.7in. x 7.4in. x 0.3in.This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1811 edition. Excerpt: . . . CHAPTER XII. i That if we act in future with greater energy and perseverance, Great Britain has a sufficient military force, and a favorable opportunity, for destroying the French empire. Of the despondency hitherto evinced in our operations by land; and of the valuable possessions, which we have consequently abandoned without neces situ. , One of the principal objections, likely to be urged against the system of martial policy laid down in the preceding pages of this essay, will, in all probability be, that Great Britain cannot furnish troops enough to make any impression on the French empire: indeed, nothing is more common than to hear it asserted, that for every soldier, whom we can send into the field, in any part of Europe, the French may send five; and what is extraordinary, they who are the readiest to make such vague assertions, Part I. H h scruple not, with equal confidence, to say that we, on the other hand, will always be able to oppose our adversaries with superior numbers by sea; although these two propositions involve, what appears to me, a most palpable contradiction. It is from a conviction, already sufficiently developed, that the French may, in process of time, if we allow them to conquer the continent, bring against us five times our numbers of ships and of seamen, as well as of soldiers, that I have recommended a vigorous attack upon them by land, in order to prevent that evil: and no after-period can be expected to afford us a better opportunity of effecting our views, than the present; when it appears, that we may not only overwhelm any fleet that they can send to sea, but that we may also cope with the greatest army which they can possibly bring into the field. The reasons which induced me to form. . . This item ships from La Vergne,TN.<

2013, ISBN: 1230227040

[EAN: 9781230227047], Neubuch, [PU: Theclassics.Us, United States], Language: English Brand New Book ***** Print on Demand *****. This historic book may have numerous typos and missing te… Mehr…

[EAN: 9781230227047], Neubuch, [PU: Theclassics.Us, United States], Language: English Brand New Book ***** Print on Demand *****. This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1811 edition. Excerpt: . CHAPTER XII. i That if we act in future with greater energy and perseverance, Great Britain has a sufficient military force, and a favorable opportunity, for destroying the French empire. Of the despondency hitherto evinced in our operations by land; and of the valuable possessions, which we have consequently abandoned without neces situ., One of the principal objections, likely to be urged against the system of martial policy laid down in the preceding pages of this essay, will, in all probability be, that Great Britain cannot furnish troops enough to make any impression on the French empire: indeed, nothing is more common than to hear it asserted, that for every soldier, whom we can send into the field, in any part of Europe, the French may send five; and what is extraordinary, they who are the readiest to make such vague assertions, Part I. H h scruple not, with equal confidence, to say that we, on the other hand, will always be able to oppose our adversaries with superior numbers by sea; although these two propositions involve, what appears to me, a most palpable contradiction. It is from a conviction, already sufficiently developed, that the French may, in process of time, if we allow them to conquer the continent, bring against us five times our numbers of ships and of seamen, as well as of soldiers, that I have recommended a vigorous attack upon them by land, in order to prevent that evil: and no after-period can be expected to afford us a better opportunity of effecting our views, than the present; when it appears, that we may not only overwhelm any fleet that they can send to sea, but that we may also cope with the greatest army which they can possibly bring into the field. The reasons which induced me to form.<

2013, ISBN: 1230227040

[EAN: 9781230227047], Neubuch, [PU: Theclassics.Us, United States], Language: English Brand New Book ***** Print on Demand *****.This historic book may have numerous typos and missing tex… Mehr…

[EAN: 9781230227047], Neubuch, [PU: Theclassics.Us, United States], Language: English Brand New Book ***** Print on Demand *****.This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1811 edition. Excerpt: . CHAPTER XII. i That if we act in future with greater energy and perseverance, Great Britain has a sufficient military force, and a favorable opportunity, for destroying the French empire. Of the despondency hitherto evinced in our operations by land; and of the valuable possessions, which we have consequently abandoned without neces situ., One of the principal objections, likely to be urged against the system of martial policy laid down in the preceding pages of this essay, will, in all probability be, that Great Britain cannot furnish troops enough to make any impression on the French empire: indeed, nothing is more common than to hear it asserted, that for every soldier, whom we can send into the field, in any part of Europe, the French may send five; and what is extraordinary, they who are the readiest to make such vague assertions, Part I. H h scruple not, with equal confidence, to say that we, on the other hand, will always be able to oppose our adversaries with superior numbers by sea; although these two propositions involve, what appears to me, a most palpable contradiction. It is from a conviction, already sufficiently developed, that the French may, in process of time, if we allow them to conquer the continent, bring against us five times our numbers of ships and of seamen, as well as of soldiers, that I have recommended a vigorous attack upon them by land, in order to prevent that evil: and no after-period can be expected to afford us a better opportunity of effecting our views, than the present; when it appears, that we may not only overwhelm any fleet that they can send to sea, but that we may also cope with the greatest army which they can possibly bring into the field. The reasons which induced me to form.<