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Nonpoint Source Water Pollution Control: Incentives Theory Approach - Helen Pushkarskaya
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Helen Pushkarskaya:
Nonpoint Source Water Pollution Control: Incentives Theory Approach - gebrauchtes Buch

1980, ISBN: 9783639164695

ID: 9783639164695

The purpose of this study was to design a regulatory policy to solve a nonpoint source (NPS) water pollution problem. Cost-sharing programs of various kinds have dominated NPS policy since the 1980's. However, such programs are neither efficient nor effective. Economists agree that, in principle, performance-based approaches are preferred to design- based, because they allow firms to choose least-cost abatement practices. However, nonpoint sources are seldom included in performance-based The purpose of this study was to design a regulatory policy to solve a nonpoint source (NPS) water pollution problem. Cost-sharing programs of various kinds have dominated NPS policy since the 1980's. However, such programs are neither efficient nor effective. Economists agree that, in principle, performance-based approaches are preferred to design- based, because they allow firms to choose least-cost abatement practices. However, nonpoint sources are seldom included in performance-based programs since it is very costly to monitor the performance of individual NPS polluters. The NPS pollution problem can be modeled as a generalized principal-agents problem. That is, the principal has to regulate agents while he cannot observe either the types and or the effort level of the agents; only total level of ambient pollution is verifiable. I show that under assumptions consistent with the NPS pollution situation it is possible to decompose the generalized principal-agent problem into two univariate variational problems in the multi-agents case, and to design a two-step contract that solves both the adverse selection and the hidden action problems. Books, Business & Economics~~Economics~~General, Nonpoint-Source-Water-Pollution-Control~~Helen-Pushkarskaya, 999999999, Nonpoint Source Water Pollution Control: Incentives Theory Approach, Helen Pushkarskaya, 3639164695, VDM Verlag Dr. Mueller Akt.ges.&Co.KG, , , , , VDM Verlag Dr. Mueller Akt.ges.&Co.KG

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Nonpoint source water pollution control: incentives theory approach - Ambient Based Group-Subsidy Scheme - Pushkarskaya, Helen
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Pushkarskaya, Helen:
Nonpoint source water pollution control: incentives theory approach - Ambient Based Group-Subsidy Scheme - Taschenbuch

2010, ISBN: 9783639164695

[ED: Taschenbuch / Paperback], [PU: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller], The purpose of this study was to design a regulatory policy to solve a nonpoint source (NPS) water pollution problem. Cost-sharing programs of various kinds have dominated NPS policy since the 1980 s. However, such programs are neither efficient nor effective. Economists agree that, in principle, performance-based approaches are preferred to design- based, because they allow firms to choose least-cost abatement practices. However, nonpoint sources are seldom included in performance-based programs since it is very costly to monitor the performance of individual NPS polluters. The NPS pollution problem can be modeled as a generalized principal-agents problem. That is, the principal has to regulate agents while he cannot observe either the types and or the effort level of the agents only total level of ambient pollution is verifiable. I show that under assumptions consistent with the NPS pollution situation it is possible to decompose the generalized principal-agent problem into two univariate variational problems in the multi-agents case, and to design a two-step contract that solves both the adverse selection and the hidden action problems., DE, [SC: 0.00], Neuware, gewerbliches Angebot, H: 220mm, B: 150mm, T: 8mm, 148, [GW: 213g], Selbstabholung und Barzahlung, PayPal, offene Rechnung, Banküberweisung, Interntationaler Versand

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Nonpoint source water pollution control: incentives theory approach - Helen Pushkarskaya
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Helen Pushkarskaya:
Nonpoint source water pollution control: incentives theory approach - neues Buch

ISBN: 9783639164695

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The purpose of this study was to design a regulatory policy to solve a nonpoint source (NPS) water pollution problem. Cost-sharing programs of various kinds have dominated NPS policy since the 1980 s. However, such programs are neither efficient nor effective. Economists agree that, in principle, performance-based approaches are preferred to design- based, because they allow firms to choose least-cost abatement practices. However, nonpoint sources are seldom included in performance-based programs since it is very costly to monitor the performance of individual NPS polluters. The NPS pollution problem can be modeled as a generalized principal-agents problem. That is, the principal has to regulate agents while he cannot observe either the types and or the effort level of the agents; only total level of ambient pollution is verifiable. I show that under assumptions consistent with the NPS pollution situation it is possible to decompose the generalized principal-agent problem into two univariate variational problems in the multi-agents case, and to design a two-step contract that solves both the adverse selection and the hidden action problems. Bücher / Sozialwissenschaften, Recht & Wirtschaft / Wirtschaft, [PU: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, Saarbrücken]

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Nonpoint source water pollution control: incentives theory approach als Buch von Helen Pushkarskaya - Helen Pushkarskaya
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Nonpoint source water pollution control: incentives theory approach als Buch von Helen Pushkarskaya - gebunden oder broschiert

ISBN: 9783639164695

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Nonpoint source water pollution control: incentives theory approach:Ambient Based Group-Subsidy Scheme Helen Pushkarskaya Nonpoint source water pollution control: incentives theory approach:Ambient Based Group-Subsidy Scheme Helen Pushkarskaya Bücher > Wissenschaft > Wirtschaftswissenschaft, VDM Verlag

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Nonpoint source water pollution control: incentives theory approach - Pushkarskaya, Helen
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Pushkarskaya, Helen:
Nonpoint source water pollution control: incentives theory approach - Taschenbuch

2010, ISBN: 3639164695

Gebundene Ausgabe, ID: 7112300

Ambient Based Group-Subsidy Scheme - Buch, gebundene Ausgabe, 148 S., Beilagen: Paperback, Erschienen: 2010 VDM Verlag, [PU: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, Saarbrücken]

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Nonpoint source water pollution control: incentives theory approach: Ambient Based Group-Subsidy Scheme

The purpose of this study was to design a regulatory policy to solve a nonpoint source (NPS) water pollution problem. Cost-sharing programs of various kinds have dominated NPS policy since the 1980's. However, such programs are neither efficient nor effective. Economists agree that, in principle, performance-based approaches are preferred to design- based, because they allow firms to choose least-cost abatement practices. However, nonpoint sources are seldom included in performance-based programs since it is very costly to monitor the performance of individual NPS polluters. The NPS pollution problem can be modeled as a generalized principal-agents problem. That is, the principal has to regulate agents while he cannot observe either the types and or the effort level of the agents; only total level of ambient pollution is verifiable. I show that under assumptions consistent with the NPS pollution situation it is possible to decompose the generalized principal-agent problem into two univariate variational problems in the multi-agents case, and to design a two-step contract that solves both the adverse selection and the hidden action problems.

Detailangaben zum Buch - Nonpoint source water pollution control: incentives theory approach: Ambient Based Group-Subsidy Scheme


EAN (ISBN-13): 9783639164695
ISBN (ISBN-10): 3639164695
Gebundene Ausgabe
Taschenbuch
Erscheinungsjahr: 2010
Herausgeber: VDM Verlag Dr. Mueller Akt.ges.&Co.KG

Buch in der Datenbank seit 19.04.2007 04:16:02
Buch zuletzt gefunden am 12.07.2017 17:55:59
ISBN/EAN: 3639164695

ISBN - alternative Schreibweisen:
3-639-16469-5, 978-3-639-16469-5


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