In the following chapters, I offer an evolutionary account of morality and from that extrapolate a version of contractarianism I call consent theory.Game theory helps to highlight the evo… Mehr…
In the following chapters, I offer an evolutionary account of morality and from that extrapolate a version of contractarianism I call consent theory.Game theory helps to highlight the evolution of morality as a resolution of interpersonal conflicts under strategic negotiation.It is this emphasis on strategic negotiation that underwrites the idea of consent.Consent theory differs from other contractarian models by abandoning reliance on rational self-interest in favour of evolutionary adaptation.From this, more emphasis will be placed on consent as natural convergence rather than consent as an idealization.My picture of contractarianism, then, ends up looking more like the relativist model offered by Harman, rather than the rational (or pseudo-rational) model offered by Gauthier, let alone the Kantian brands of Rawls or Scanlon.So at least some of my discussion will dwell on why it is no loss to abandon hope for the universal, categorical morality that rational models promise.In the introduction, I offer the betting analogy that underwrites the remaining picture.There are some bets where the expected utility is positive, though the odds of winning on this particular occasion are exceedingly low.In such cases, we cannot hope to give an argument that taking the bet is rational.The only thing we can say is that those predisposed to take this kind of bet on these kinds of occasions will do better than those with other dispositions, so long as such games occur often enough.; PDF; Politics, Philosphy & Religion > Philosophy > Ethics & moral philosophy, Springer Netherlands<
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In the following chapters, I offer an evolutionary account of morality and from that extrapolate a version of contractarianism I call consent theory. Game theory helps to highlight the ev… Mehr…
In the following chapters, I offer an evolutionary account of morality and from that extrapolate a version of contractarianism I call consent theory. Game theory helps to highlight the evolution of morality as a resolution of interpersonal conflicts under strategic negotiation. It is this emphasis on strategic negotiation that underwrites the idea of consent. Consent theory differs from other contractarian models by abandoning reliance on rational self-interest in favour of evolutionary adaptation. From this, more emphasis will be placed on consent as natural convergence rather than consent as an idealization. My picture of contractarianism, then, ends up looking more like the relativist model offered by Harman, rather than the rational (or pseudo-rational) model offered by Gauthier, let alone the Kantian brands of Rawls or Scanlon. So at least some of my discussion will dwell on why it is no loss to abandon hope for the universal, categorical morality that rational models promise. In the introduction, I offer the betting analogy that underwrites the remaining picture. There are some bets where the expected utility is positive, though the odds of winning on this particular occasion are exceedingly low. In such cases, we cannot hope to give an argument that taking the bet is rational. The only thing we can say is that those predisposed to take this kind of bet on these kinds of occasions will do better than those with other dispositions, so long as such games occur often enough., Springer<
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This book illuminates and sharpens moral theory, by analyzing the evolutionary dynamics of interpersonal relations in a variety of games. We discover that successful players in evolutiona… Mehr…
This book illuminates and sharpens moral theory, by analyzing the evolutionary dynamics of interpersonal relations in a variety of games. We discover that successful players in evolutionary games operate as if following this piece of normative advice: Don't do unto others without their consent. From this advice, some significant implications for moral theory follow. First, we cannot view morality as a categorical imperative. Secondly, we cannot hope to offer rational justification for adopting moral advice. This is where Glaucon and Adeimantus went astray: they wanted a proof of the benefits of morality in every single case. That is not possible. Moral constraint is a bad bet taken in and of itself. But there is some good news: moral constraint is a good bet when examined statistically. TOC:From the contents Introduction.- 1. Irrealism.- 2. Against Moral Categoricity.- 3. Self-Interest.- 4. Rationality's Failure.- 5. Evolutionary Fit.- 6. Consent Theory.- 7. Concerned Parties.- 8. Suffering and Indifference.- Bibliography.- Index. eBook Malcolm Murray PDF, Springer, 05.05.2007, Springer, 2007<
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(*) Derzeit vergriffen bedeutet, dass dieser Titel momentan auf keiner der angeschlossenen Plattform verfügbar ist.
In the following chapters, I offer an evolutionary account of morality and from that extrapolate a version of contractarianism I call consent theory.Game theory helps to highlight the evo… Mehr…
In the following chapters, I offer an evolutionary account of morality and from that extrapolate a version of contractarianism I call consent theory.Game theory helps to highlight the evolution of morality as a resolution of interpersonal conflicts under strategic negotiation.It is this emphasis on strategic negotiation that underwrites the idea of consent.Consent theory differs from other contractarian models by abandoning reliance on rational self-interest in favour of evolutionary adaptation.From this, more emphasis will be placed on consent as natural convergence rather than consent as an idealization.My picture of contractarianism, then, ends up looking more like the relativist model offered by Harman, rather than the rational (or pseudo-rational) model offered by Gauthier, let alone the Kantian brands of Rawls or Scanlon.So at least some of my discussion will dwell on why it is no loss to abandon hope for the universal, categorical morality that rational models promise.In the introduction, I offer the betting analogy that underwrites the remaining picture.There are some bets where the expected utility is positive, though the odds of winning on this particular occasion are exceedingly low.In such cases, we cannot hope to give an argument that taking the bet is rational.The only thing we can say is that those predisposed to take this kind of bet on these kinds of occasions will do better than those with other dispositions, so long as such games occur often enough.; PDF; Politics, Philosphy & Religion > Philosophy > Ethics & moral philosophy, Springer Netherlands<
No. 9781402058554. Versandkosten:Instock, Despatched same working day before 3pm, zzgl. Versandkosten.
In the following chapters, I offer an evolutionary account of morality and from that extrapolate a version of contractarianism I call consent theory. Game theory helps to highlight the ev… Mehr…
In the following chapters, I offer an evolutionary account of morality and from that extrapolate a version of contractarianism I call consent theory. Game theory helps to highlight the evolution of morality as a resolution of interpersonal conflicts under strategic negotiation. It is this emphasis on strategic negotiation that underwrites the idea of consent. Consent theory differs from other contractarian models by abandoning reliance on rational self-interest in favour of evolutionary adaptation. From this, more emphasis will be placed on consent as natural convergence rather than consent as an idealization. My picture of contractarianism, then, ends up looking more like the relativist model offered by Harman, rather than the rational (or pseudo-rational) model offered by Gauthier, let alone the Kantian brands of Rawls or Scanlon. So at least some of my discussion will dwell on why it is no loss to abandon hope for the universal, categorical morality that rational models promise. In the introduction, I offer the betting analogy that underwrites the remaining picture. There are some bets where the expected utility is positive, though the odds of winning on this particular occasion are exceedingly low. In such cases, we cannot hope to give an argument that taking the bet is rational. The only thing we can say is that those predisposed to take this kind of bet on these kinds of occasions will do better than those with other dispositions, so long as such games occur often enough., Springer<
Nr. 978-1-4020-5855-4. Versandkosten:Worldwide free shipping, , DE. (EUR 0.00)
This book illuminates and sharpens moral theory, by analyzing the evolutionary dynamics of interpersonal relations in a variety of games. We discover that successful players in evolutiona… Mehr…
This book illuminates and sharpens moral theory, by analyzing the evolutionary dynamics of interpersonal relations in a variety of games. We discover that successful players in evolutionary games operate as if following this piece of normative advice: Don't do unto others without their consent. From this advice, some significant implications for moral theory follow. First, we cannot view morality as a categorical imperative. Secondly, we cannot hope to offer rational justification for adopting moral advice. This is where Glaucon and Adeimantus went astray: they wanted a proof of the benefits of morality in every single case. That is not possible. Moral constraint is a bad bet taken in and of itself. But there is some good news: moral constraint is a good bet when examined statistically. TOC:From the contents Introduction.- 1. Irrealism.- 2. Against Moral Categoricity.- 3. Self-Interest.- 4. Rationality's Failure.- 5. Evolutionary Fit.- 6. Consent Theory.- 7. Concerned Parties.- 8. Suffering and Indifference.- Bibliography.- Index. eBook Malcolm Murray PDF, Springer, 05.05.2007, Springer, 2007<
Nr. 24487259. Versandkosten:, Sofort per Download lieferbar, DE. (EUR 0.00)
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Buch in der Datenbank seit 2008-03-09T12:32:38+01:00 (Berlin) Detailseite zuletzt geändert am 2024-03-05T13:52:28+01:00 (Berlin) ISBN/EAN: 1402058551
ISBN - alternative Schreibweisen: 1-4020-5855-1, 978-1-4020-5855-4 Alternative Schreibweisen und verwandte Suchbegriffe: Autor des Buches: murray
Daten vom Verlag:
Autor/in: Malcolm Murray Titel: Philosophical Studies Series; The Moral Wager - Evolution and Contract Verlag: Springer; Springer Netherland 247 Seiten Erscheinungsjahr: 2007-05-05 Dordrecht; NL Sprache: Englisch 96,29 € (DE) 99,00 € (AT) 118,00 CHF (CH) Available IX, 247 p.
EA; E107; eBook; Nonbooks, PBS / Philosophie/Allgemeines, Lexika; Ethik und Moralphilosophie; Verstehen; Philosophie; Contractarianism; Evolution; Evolutionary ethics; Game theory; Instrumentalism; Irrealism; morality; B; Moral Philosophy and Applied Ethics; Game Theory; Evolutionary Biology; Philosophy; Religion and Philosophy; Spieltheorie; Evolution; Philosophie; BB
Irrealism.- Against Moral Categoricity.- Self-Interest.- Rationality’s Failure.- Evolutionary Fit.- Consent Theory.- Concerned Parties.- Suffering and Indifference. Best overarching defence of evolutionary ethics yet Excellent synthesis of biology, game theory, and contractarian ethics Offers a revisionist contractarian normative theory Great, sustained, dialectic progression throughout Wonderfully clear, witty, and engaging
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