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Kleinster Preis: 52.98 EUR, größter Preis: 59.00 EUR, Mittelwert: 57.8 EUR
Bargaining and Economic Coercion - Valentin L. Krustev
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Valentin L. Krustev:

Bargaining and Economic Coercion - Taschenbuch

2000, ISBN: 9783836473101

ID: 9783836473101

The Use and Effectiveness of Sanctions International economic sanctions keep increasing their popularity, but empirical studies show that sanctions rarely persuade targeted countries to change their policies. If sanctions are ineffective, why do policy makers persist in using them This paradox has led many scholars to argue that rather than being foreign policy oriented, sanctions have more to do with domestic politics or symbolism. Building on an alternative idea of sanctions as the visible part of a larger, more complicated interaction, this study proposes a bargaining theory that explains the sanctions puzzle. First, senders and targets bargain in the shadow of war, and sanctions appear ineffective because military threats prevent their full deployment. Second, senders frequently find it rational to overreach in their demands, selecting themselves into difficult disputes. The rigorous empirical analysis of 888 sanctions cases between 1971-2000 supports the theoretical argument. If the target does not have military preponderance and the sender seeks less extreme policy changes, sanctions can be reasonably effective foreign policy instruments. Bargaining and Economic Coercion: International economic sanctions keep increasing their popularity, but empirical studies show that sanctions rarely persuade targeted countries to change their policies. If sanctions are ineffective, why do policy makers persist in using them This paradox has led many scholars to argue that rather than being foreign policy oriented, sanctions have more to do with domestic politics or symbolism. Building on an alternative idea of sanctions as the visible part of a larger, more complicated interaction, this study proposes a bargaining theory that explains the sanctions puzzle. First, senders and targets bargain in the shadow of war, and sanctions appear ineffective because military threats prevent their full deployment. Second, senders frequently find it rational to overreach in their demands, selecting themselves into difficult disputes. The rigorous empirical analysis of 888 sanctions cases between 1971-2000 supports the theoretical argument. If the target does not have military preponderance and the sender seeks less extreme policy changes, sanctions can be reasonably effective foreign policy instruments., VDM Verlag

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Bargaining And Economic Coercion - The Use And Effectiveness Of Sanctions - Valentin L. Krustev
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Bargaining And Economic Coercion - The Use And Effectiveness Of Sanctions - gebrauchtes Buch

2000, ISBN: 9783836473101

ID: 9783836473101

International economic sanctions keep increasing their popularity, but empirical studies show that sanctions rarely persuade targeted countries to change their policies. If sanctions are ineffective, why do policy makers persist in using them? This paradox has led many scholars to argue that rather than being foreign policy oriented, sanctions have more to do with domestic politics or symbolism. Building on an alternative idea of sanctions as the visible part of a larger, more complicated International economic sanctions keep increasing their popularity, but empirical studies show that sanctions rarely persuade targeted countries to change their policies. If sanctions are ineffective, why do policy makers persist in using them? This paradox has led many scholars to argue that rather than being foreign policy oriented, sanctions have more to do with domestic politics or symbolism. Building on an alternative idea of sanctions as the visible part of a larger, more complicated interaction, this study proposes a bargaining theory that explains the sanctions puzzle. First, senders and targets bargain in the shadow of war, and sanctions appear ineffective because military threats prevent their full deployment. Second, senders frequently find it rational to overreach in their demands, selecting themselves into difficult disputes. The rigorous empirical analysis of 888 sanctions cases between 1971-2000 supports the theoretical argument. If the target does not have military prepon-derance and the sender seeks less extreme policy changes, sanctions can be reasonably effective foreign policy instruments. Books, Political Science & Government~~General, Bargaining-And-Economic-Coercion-The-Use-And-Effectiveness-Of-Sanctions~~Valentin-L-Krustev, 999999999, Bargaining And Economic Coercion - The Use And Effectiveness Of Sanctions, Valentin L. Krustev, 3836473100, VDM Verlag Dr. Mueller e.K., , , , , VDM Verlag Dr. Mueller e.K.

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Bargaining and Economic Coercion - Valentin L. Krustev
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Valentin L. Krustev:
Bargaining and Economic Coercion - Taschenbuch

2000

ISBN: 9783836473101

[ED: Taschenbuch], [PU: VDM Verlag], Neuware - International economic sanctions keep increasing their popularity, but empirical studies show that sanctions rarely persuade targeted countries to change their policies. If sanctions are ineffective, why do policy makers persist in using them This paradox has led many scholars to argue that rather than being foreign policy oriented, sanctions have more to do with domestic politics or symbolism. Building on an alternative idea of sanctions as the visible part of a larger, more complicated interaction, this study proposes a bargaining theory that explains the sanctions puzzle. First, senders and targets bargain in the shadow of war, and sanctions appear ineffective because military threats prevent their full deployment. Second, senders frequently find it rational to overreach in their demands, selecting themselves into difficult disputes. The rigorous empirical analysis of 888 sanctions cases between 1971-2000 supports the theoretical argument. If the target does not have military preponderance and the sender seeks less extreme policy changes, sanctions can be reasonably effective foreign policy instruments. -, [SC: 0.00]

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Bargaining and Economic Coercion - Valentin L. Krustev
Vergriffenes Buch, derzeit bei uns nicht verfügbar.
(*)
Valentin L. Krustev:
Bargaining and Economic Coercion - Taschenbuch

2000, ISBN: 9783836473101

[ED: Taschenbuch], [PU: VDM Verlag], Neuware - International economic sanctions keep increasing their popularity, but empirical studies show that sanctions rarely persuade targeted countries to change their policies. If sanctions are ineffective, why do policy makers persist in using them This paradox has led many scholars to argue that rather than being foreign policy oriented, sanctions have more to do with domestic politics or symbolism. Building on an alternative idea of sanctions as the visible part of a larger, more complicated interaction, this study proposes a bargaining theory that explains the sanctions puzzle. First, senders and targets bargain in the shadow of war, and sanctions appear ineffective because military threats prevent their full deployment. Second, senders frequently find it rational to overreach in their demands, selecting themselves into difficult disputes. The rigorous empirical analysis of 888 sanctions cases between 1971-2000 supports the theoretical argument. If the target does not have military preponderance and the sender seeks less extreme policy changes, sanctions can be reasonably effective foreign policy instruments., [SC: 0.00]

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Bargaining and Economic Coercion - Valentin L. Krustev
Vergriffenes Buch, derzeit bei uns nicht verfügbar.
(*)
Valentin L. Krustev:
Bargaining and Economic Coercion - Taschenbuch

2000, ISBN: 9783836473101

[ED: Taschenbuch], [PU: VDM Verlag], Neuware - International economic sanctions keep increasing their popularity, but empirical studies show that sanctions rarely persuade targeted countries to change their policies. If sanctions are ineffective, why do policy makers persist in using them This paradox has led many scholars to argue that rather than being foreign policy oriented, sanctions have more to do with domestic politics or symbolism. Building on an alternative idea of sanctions as the visible part of a larger, more complicated interaction, this study proposes a bargaining theory that explains the sanctions puzzle. First, senders and targets bargain in the shadow of war, and sanctions appear ineffective because military threats prevent their full deployment. Second, senders frequently find it rational to overreach in their demands, selecting themselves into difficult disputes. The rigorous empirical analysis of 888 sanctions cases between 1971-2000 supports the theoretical argument. If the target does not have military preponderance and the sender seeks less extreme policy changes, sanctions can be reasonably effective foreign policy instruments., [SC: 1.40]

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Details zum Buch
Bargaining and Economic Coercion
Autor:

Krustev, Valentin L.

Titel:

Bargaining and Economic Coercion

ISBN-Nummer:

9783836473101

Detailangaben zum Buch - Bargaining and Economic Coercion


EAN (ISBN-13): 9783836473101
ISBN (ISBN-10): 3836473100
Gebundene Ausgabe
Taschenbuch
Erscheinungsjahr: 2008
Herausgeber: VDM Verlag
164 Seiten
Gewicht: 0,261 kg
Sprache: eng/Englisch

Buch in der Datenbank seit 22.01.2008 03:25:13
Buch zuletzt gefunden am 18.03.2016 12:36:14
ISBN/EAN: 9783836473101

ISBN - alternative Schreibweisen:
3-8364-7310-0, 978-3-8364-7310-1

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