2009, ISBN: 9781234112554

Rarebooksclub.com. Paperback. New. This item is printed on demand. Paperback. 126 pages. Original publisher: Washington : U. S. G. P. O. , 2009. LC Number: KF27 . F639 2009 OCLC Number:… Mehr…

Rarebooksclub.com. Paperback. New. This item is printed on demand. Paperback. 126 pages. Original publisher: Washington : U. S. G. P. O. , 2009. LC Number: KF27 . F639 2009 OCLC Number: (OCoLC)370415823 Subject: Nuclear nonproliferation -- Korea (North). Excerpt: . . . 11 on when we believe there is no U. S. nuclear threat. We must pro-ceed step by step, action for action. Now, all of those I met said that North Korea has already weaponized the 68 pounds of plutonium acknowledged in its formal declaration, and that therefore the weapons cant be inspected since they are military. Sixty-eight pounds, as you know, is enough for four or five nu-clear weapons, depending on the grade of plutonium, the specific weapons design and the desired explosive yield. What this means is that the objective of the Six-Party negotiations and United States negotiations directly with North Korea, which I think have to be the heart of our policy, should now be to cap, to cap the de-clared North Korean arsenal at four or five weapons by completing the disabling of the Yongbyon reactor to which you referred now in progress, and by negotiating the terms for completely dismantling the reactor which, of course, has been envisaged in the denucleari-zation scenario now being negotiated. In return for dismantlement, North Korea wants a binding com-mitment to complete the two light-water reactors for electricity promised under the 1994 agreed framework. That is sure to stir up controversy in Washington, but in Pyongyang it seems logical to the North Korea, first, because the reactors were promised; second, because nearly 3 billion has already been spent on them to the build the infrastructure at Kumho, and above all, because North Korea suspended its nuclear weapons program from 1994 until 2002, in return for that promise. North Korea suspended its nuclear weapons program from 1994 until 2002 in return for the promise of light-water reactors. Well, to sum up, North Korea had adopted what to us will be a much harder line than before, and the question is why. Some say it is just a . . . This item ships from La Vergne,TN., Rarebooksclub.com<

2009, ISBN: 9781234112554

RareBooksClub. Paperback. New. This item is printed on demand. Paperback. 126 pages. Original publisher: Washington : U. S. G. P. O. , 2009. LC Number: KF27 . F639 2009 OCLC Number: (OC… Mehr…

RareBooksClub. Paperback. New. This item is printed on demand. Paperback. 126 pages. Original publisher: Washington : U. S. G. P. O. , 2009. LC Number: KF27 . F639 2009 OCLC Number: (OCoLC)370415823 Subject: Nuclear nonproliferation -- Korea (North). Excerpt: . . . 11 on when we believe there is no U. S. nuclear threat. We must pro-ceed step by step, action for action. Now, all of those I met said that North Korea has already weaponized the 68 pounds of plutonium acknowledged in its formal declaration, and that therefore the weapons cant be inspected since they are military. Sixty-eight pounds, as you know, is enough for four or five nu-clear weapons, depending on the grade of plutonium, the specific weapons design and the desired explosive yield. What this means is that the objective of the Six-Party negotiations and United States negotiations directly with North Korea, which I think have to be the heart of our policy, should now be to cap, to cap the de-clared North Korean arsenal at four or five weapons by completing the disabling of the Yongbyon reactor to which you referred now in progress, and by negotiating the terms for completely dismantling the reactor which, of course, has been envisaged in the denucleari-zation scenario now being negotiated. In return for dismantlement, North Korea wants a binding com-mitment to complete the two light-water reactors for electricity promised under the 1994 agreed framework. That is sure to stir up controversy in Washington, but in Pyongyang it seems logical to the North Korea, first, because the reactors were promised; second, because nearly 3 billion has already been spent on them to the build the infrastructure at Kumho, and above all, because North Korea suspended its nuclear weapons program from 1994 until 2002, in return for that promise. North Korea suspended its nuclear weapons program from 1994 until 2002 in return for the promise of light-water reactors. Well, to sum up, North Korea had adopted what to us will be a much harder line than before, and the question is why. Some say it is just a . . . This item ships from La Vergne,TN., RareBooksClub<