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Nonpoint Source Water Pollution Control: Incentives Theory Approach - Helen Pushkarskaya
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Helen Pushkarskaya:

Nonpoint Source Water Pollution Control: Incentives Theory Approach - gebrauchtes Buch

1980, ISBN: 9783639164695

ID: 9783639164695

The purpose of this study was to design a regulatory policy to solve a nonpoint source (NPS) water pollution problem. Cost-sharing programs of various kinds have dominated NPS policy since the 1980's. However, such programs are neither efficient nor effective. Economists agree that, in principle, performance-based approaches are preferred to design- based, because they allow firms to choose least-cost abatement practices. However, nonpoint sources are seldom included in performance-based The purpose of this study was to design a regulatory policy to solve a nonpoint source (NPS) water pollution problem. Cost-sharing programs of various kinds have dominated NPS policy since the 1980's. However, such programs are neither efficient nor effective. Economists agree that, in principle, performance-based approaches are preferred to design- based, because they allow firms to choose least-cost abatement practices. However, nonpoint sources are seldom included in performance-based programs since it is very costly to monitor the performance of individual NPS polluters. The NPS pollution problem can be modeled as a generalized principal-agents problem. That is, the principal has to regulate agents while he cannot observe either the types and or the effort level of the agents; only total level of ambient pollution is verifiable. I show that under assumptions consistent with the NPS pollution situation it is possible to decompose the generalized principal-agent problem into two univariate variational problems in the multi-agents case, and to design a two-step contract that solves both the adverse selection and the hidden action problems. Books, Business & Economics~~Economics~~General, Nonpoint-Source-Water-Pollution-Control~~Helen-Pushkarskaya, 999999999, Nonpoint Source Water Pollution Control: Incentives Theory Approach, Helen Pushkarskaya, 3639164695, VDM Verlag Dr. Mueller Akt.ges.&Co.KG, , , , , VDM Verlag Dr. Mueller Akt.ges.&Co.KG

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Nonpoint source water pollution control: incentives theory approach: Ambient Based Group-Subsidy Scheme - Helen Pushkarskaya
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Nonpoint source water pollution control: incentives theory approach: Ambient Based Group-Subsidy Scheme - Taschenbuch

ISBN: 3639164695

Paperback, [EAN: 9783639164695], VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, Book, [PU: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller], VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, The purpose of this study was to design a regulatory policy to solve a nonpoint source (NPS) water pollution problem. Cost-sharing programs of various kinds have dominated NPS policy since the 1980?s. However, such programs are neither efficient nor effective. Economists agree that, in principle, performance-based approaches are preferred to design- based, because they allow firms to choose least-cost abatement practices. However, nonpoint sources are seldom included in performance-based programs since it is very costly to monitor the performance of individual NPS polluters. The NPS pollution problem can be modeled as a generalized principal-agents problem. That is, the principal has to regulate agents while he cannot observe either the types and or the effort level of the agents; only total level of ambient pollution is verifiable. I show that under assumptions consistent with the NPS pollution situation it is possible to decompose the generalized principal-agent problem into two univariate variational problems in the multi-agents case, and to design a two-step contract that solves both the adverse selection and the hidden action problems., 2581, Economics, 2739, Commerce, 2583, Comparative, 2585, Development & Growth, 2586, Econometrics, 2587, Economic Conditions, 2589, Economic History, 2588, Economic Policy & Development, 1043856, Environmental Economics, 2591, Free Enterprise, 2595, Labor & Industrial Relations, 2596, Macroeconomics, 2597, Microeconomics, 2598, Money & Monetary Policy, 2599, Public Finance, 2602, Theory, 1043858, Unemployment, 2603, Urban & Regional, 3, Business & Investing, 1000, Subjects, 283155, Books, 355577011, Popular Economics, 3, Business & Investing, 1000, Subjects, 283155, Books

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Nonpoint source water pollution control: incentives theory approach - Helen Pushkarskaya
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The purpose of this study was to design a regulatory policy to solve a nonpoint source (NPS) water pollution problem. Cost-sharing programs of various kinds have dominated NPS policy since the 1980 s. However, such programs are neither efficient nor effective. Economists agree that, in principle, performance-based approaches are preferred to design- based, because they allow firms to choose least-cost abatement practices. However, nonpoint sources are seldom included in performance-based programs since it is very costly to monitor the performance of individual NPS polluters. The NPS pollution problem can be modeled as a generalized principal-agents problem. That is, the principal has to regulate agents while he cannot observe either the types and or the effort level of the agents; only total level of ambient pollution is verifiable. I show that under assumptions consistent with the NPS pollution situation it is possible to decompose the generalized principal-agent problem into two univariate variational problems in the multi-agents case, and to design a two-step contract that solves both the adverse selection and the hidden action problems. Bücher / Sozialwissenschaften, Recht & Wirtschaft / Wirtschaft, [PU: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, Saarbrücken]

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Nonpoint source water pollution control: incentives theory approach - Pushkarskaya, Helen
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Pushkarskaya, Helen:
Nonpoint source water pollution control: incentives theory approach - Taschenbuch

2010, ISBN: 3639164695

Gebundene Ausgabe, ID: 7112300

Ambient Based Group-Subsidy Scheme - Buch, gebundene Ausgabe, 148 S., Beilagen: Paperback, Erschienen: 2010 VDM Verlag, [PU: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, Saarbrücken]

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Nonpoint source water pollution control:             incentives theory approach - Pushkarskaya, Helen
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Pushkarskaya, Helen:
Nonpoint source water pollution control: incentives theory approach - gebrauchtes Buch

ISBN: 9783639164695

ID: 613463310

VDM Verlag, 42010. New. Please note this is a Print on Demand title and allow an additional 2 weeks approx. for delivery., VDM Verlag, 42010

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Nonpoint source water pollution control: incentives theory approach: Ambient Based Group-Subsidy Scheme
Autor:

Pushkarskaya, Helen

Titel:

Nonpoint source water pollution control: incentives theory approach: Ambient Based Group-Subsidy Scheme

ISBN-Nummer:

3639164695

The purpose of this study was to design a regulatory policy to solve a nonpoint source (NPS) water pollution problem. Cost-sharing programs of various kinds have dominated NPS policy since the 1980's. However, such programs are neither efficient nor effective. Economists agree that, in principle, performance-based approaches are preferred to design- based, because they allow firms to choose least-cost abatement practices. However, nonpoint sources are seldom included in performance-based programs since it is very costly to monitor the performance of individual NPS polluters. The NPS pollution problem can be modeled as a generalized principal-agents problem. That is, the principal has to regulate agents while he cannot observe either the types and or the effort level of the agents; only total level of ambient pollution is verifiable. I show that under assumptions consistent with the NPS pollution situation it is possible to decompose the generalized principal-agent problem into two univariate variational problems in the multi-agents case, and to design a two-step contract that solves both the adverse selection and the hidden action problems.

Detailangaben zum Buch - Nonpoint source water pollution control: incentives theory approach: Ambient Based Group-Subsidy Scheme


EAN (ISBN-13): 9783639164695
ISBN (ISBN-10): 3639164695
Gebundene Ausgabe
Taschenbuch
Erscheinungsjahr: 2010
Herausgeber: VDM Verlag Dr. Mueller Akt.ges.&Co.KG

Buch in der Datenbank seit 19.04.2007 04:16:02
Buch zuletzt gefunden am 20.11.2016 13:40:26
ISBN/EAN: 3639164695

ISBN - alternative Schreibweisen:
3-639-16469-5, 978-3-639-16469-5

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